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Notes and Comments
William Tetley* Maritime Law Judgments in
Canada - 1979
I. Jurisdiction
As in 1978, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada was the
major problem litigated upon in the Courts or at least the major
problem reported in 1979.1 The number of jurisdiction cases was
nevertheless less than in 1978 when almost half the reported
judgments concerned themselves with whether or not the Federal
Court had jurisdiction. The reduction in jurisdiction cases was
perhaps due to the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada
in TropwoodA.G. v. Sivaco2 and the efforts of the Federal Court of
Appeal to distinguish Quebec North Shore Paper v. C.P. Ltd. 3 and
McNamara Construction v. The Queen4. Certainly the strict
guidelines of the two foregoing judgments were interpreted very
broadly in 1979 and in some cases seem to have even been set aside.
In this way the jurisdiction of the Federal Court has been clarified
and widened.
1) TropwoodA.G. v. Sivaco
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 157; (1980), 99 D.LoR. (3d) 235; (1979), 26
N.R. 313 (S.C.C.)
The Supreme Court of Canada enlarged its previous narrow
definition of jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada and held
that the Court had jurisdiction over a claim for damage to goods
carried by sea into a Canadian port from France. Because of the
decisions in Quebec North Shore5 and McNamara Construction6 the
court was compelled to seek out a body of federal law upon which
its jurisdiction could be exercised. According to s.2 of the Federal
*William Tetley, Q.C. of McGill University Law Faculty and the Bar of the
Province of Quebec.
1. The judgments referred to in this article are those reported in the various law
reports during the calendar year 1979.
2. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 157.
3. [1977]2S.C.R. 1054.
4. t1977]2 S.C.R. 654.
5. Supra, note 3.
6. Supra, note 4.
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Court Act, "Canadian Maritime Law" incorporates the law that
was administered by the Exchequer Court "by virtue of the
Admiralty Act or any other statute." The Supreme Court relied
upon the words "any other statute" to resurrect the repealed
Admiralty Act of 1891. The effect of s.4 of the 1891 Act was to
bring such claims within the purview of the Exchequer Court of
Canada.
Having concluded the claim under consideration was one within
the scope of admiralty law as it was incorporated into the law of
Canada by the 1891 Act, the Court next had to decide whether the
claim fell within the scope of federal power in relation to navigation
and shipping. The Water Carriage of Goods Act, a recognized
federal statute, only applies to outward shipments from Canada and
was not applicable in the case at hand. Nevertheless it was held that
"The relationship between carriers of goods by ship and shippers or
owners or consignees of such goods is one upon which Parliament is
entitled to legislate. .. 7
In light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in this case, it is
suggested that the Court actually took Quebec North Shore8 to mean
only that the claim must fall within the scope of federal power in
relation to navigation and shipping, and that it is not essential that a
federal law apply in the case in question.
2) The following case was decided subsequent to the Supreme
Court decision in Tropwood v. Sivaco (above).
Bensol Customs Brokers Ltd. v. Air Canada,
[1979] 2 F.C. 575; (1980), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 623, (Fed. C.A.)
[1979] 1 F.C. 167; (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 613.
The Federal Court of Appeal reversing Walsh J., held that the
Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear a claim for loss of goods
carried by air from London, England to Montreal. Pratte J., with
whom Le Dain J. and Hyde D.J. were in basic agreement, reasoned
that s.23 of the Federal Court Act stated two conditions which must
be met in order that a claim be within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court. The two conditions being:9
(1) the claim must be made "under an Act of the Parliament of
Canada or otherwise;" and
7. TropwoodA.G. v. Sivaco (1980), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 235 at p. 242.
8. Supra, note 3.
9. Bensol Customs Brokers Ltd. v. Air Canada (1980), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 623 at p.
625 and 626.
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(2) it must be related to a matter coming within any of the classes
of subjects specified in the latter part of s.23 (i.e. within one of:
aeronautics, and works and undertakings connecting a province
with any other province or extending beyond the limits of a
province).
The appellants were found to have met the first condition as they
claimed under the Carriage by Air Act which was incorporated into
the law of Canada in 1955. It was not considered detrimental to the
appellants case that they also claimed tortious liability of the
respondents even though it is arguable that the Carriage by Air Act
did not supersede tortious liability. According to Pratte J. even if the
latter were accurate it would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court
to hear and decide the claim based on the Carriage by Air Act.
Nor was it detrimental to the appellants case that the real plaintiff
was the insurance company who had been subrogated to the rights
of the owners of the goods. In effect the claim was made both under
the Carriage by Air Act and under the law governing subrogation.
On this point Pratte J. reasoned that the appellants action need not
be based exclusively on a Canadian Act. In this manner Pratte J. has
widened the rigid strictures of the earlier cases of Quebec North
Shore 10 and McNamara Const. I"
The extent to which Pratte J. actually widened these strictures is
uncertain as he implied that the court could not hear a tort claim
since it was not based on a Canadian Act while on the latter point he
was certain that the Court could hear a claim based both on a
Canadian Act and on the law governing subrogation.
With regard to these two latter points, Le Dain J. would appear to
have gone further than Pratte J. in that he did not distinguish
between a claim based on the law of tort and one based on the law of
subrogation. Le Dain J. reasoned that the Quebec North Shore12 and
McNamara Const.13 cases did not suggest that a claim must be
based solely on federal law. He considered it inevitable that claims
will arise in which rights and obligations of the parties will be
determined partly by federal and partly by provincial law. In
particular Le Dain J. stated that "it should be sufficient . . . if the
rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined to some
material extent by federal law. It should not be necessary that the
10. Supra, note 3.
11. Supra, note 4.
12. Supra, note 3.
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cause of action be one created by federal law so long as it is one
affected by it." 1 4
As to the second requirement of s.23 (see above) Pratte J. had
little difficulty in concluding that the respondent operated an
undertaking that extended beyond the limits of a Province and that
the damage occurred in the course of the operation of that
undertaking.
With regard to this second condition Le Dain J. agreed that
reasoning of Pratte J. was sufficient to decide the case but went on
to say that the language of s.23 contemplates matters falling within
specific and established areas of federal legislative competence and
he deplored any narrow or technical interpretation of those matters.
While the narrower position of Pratte J. stands as the ratio of this
case, one can see that taken together the expansions suggested by Le
Dain J. lead independently to the same conclusion as was reached in
the Supreme Court in Tropwood v. Sivaco15 namely that the claim
fall within the scope of federal competence.
[Reversed by the Supreme Court, [1980] 30 N.R. 104]
The following cases were decided prior to Tropwood v.
Sivaco16 .
3) Hawker Industries Ltd. v. Santa Maria Shipowning & Trading
Co., S.A., [1979] 1.F.C. 183 (Fed. C.A.)
Jackett C.J. speaking for the Federal Court of Appeal held that the
Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear a claim for breach of a
contract to repair a ship which had been disabled at sea.
As Jackett C.J. understood Quebec North Shore17 and
McNamara Const. 18 the only question was whether the claim was
founded upon:
(a) provincial law, in which case it does not fall within "laws of
Canada" and would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Trial
Division, or' 9
(b) federal law, in which case it would fall within the "laws of
13. Supra, note 4.
14. Bensol Customs Brokers Ltd. v. Air Canada (1980), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 623 at p.
630.
15. Supra, note 2.
16. Ibid.
17. Supra, note 3.
18. Supra, note4.
19. Hawker Industries Ltd. v. Santa Maria Shipowning & Trading Co. S.A.,
[1979] 1 F.C. 183 atp. 186.
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Canada" and Parliament could confer jurisdiction on the
Trial division.
20
Jackett C.J. went on to conclude in effect that there is and has
always been in England a body of Admiralty law, that such law
which was incorporated into Canadian law and amended by
legislation and is "federal" and not provincial law and jurisdiction
can be conferred by Parliament under section 101 of the British
North America Act.
Jackett C.J. did not follow the test laid down in the Supreme
Court cases. True the Supreme Court cases decided that there must
be existing federal law in order that the Federal court have
jurisdiction but the Supreme Court in McNamara Const.21 explicitly
frowned upon the approach which Jackett C.J. in effect adopted in
the Hawker Industries22 case. As was said by Laskin C.J. in
McNamara Const., "The common law rule that the Crown may sue
in any Court having jurisdiction in the particular matter, developed
in a unitary England and has no unlimited application to federal
Canada where legislative and executive power are distributed
between the central and provincial levels of legislature..."2
4) The "Capricorn" v. Antares Shipping Corp.
(1979), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 28 (Fed. C.A.)
The Federal Court of Appeal defined the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court by a reasoning, not directly contrary to the Supreme Court in
Quebec North Shore
24
The Court of Appeal noted that sections 2 and 42 of the Federal
Court Act define an existing federal law over which the Federal
Court has jurisdiction. This law is the law formerly administered by
the Exchequer Court on its Admiralty side and also the law that the
Court would have administered had it had unlimited jurisdiction.
The foregoing jurisdiction in turn is part of Canadian maritime law.
Le Dain J. in a very detailed survey of the development of Canadian
maritime law thus provides a most useful definition of the Federal
Court jurisdiction in Admiralty.
In consequence in the case at hand the Court of Appeal held that
the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim for
20. Ibid.
21. Supra, note 4.
22. [1979] 1 F.C. 183.
23. McNamara Const. V. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654 at p. 660.
24. Supra, note 3.
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specific performance of a contract of sale of a ship because it did not
fall within Canadian Maritime Law.
5) Benson Bros. Shipbuilding Co. (1960) Ltd. v. Mark Fishing
Co.
(1979), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 527 (Fed. C.A.)
The Federal Court was held to have jurisdiction to hear a claim for
building a ship whether or not the ship was under arrest. The
argument was similar to that presented in The "Capricorn" v.
Antares Shipping Corp.25 The Federal Court Act, at s.2 defines
Canadian maritime law to include all the law that was administered
by the Exchequer Court of Canada on its admiralty side or would
have been administered if the Court had had unlimited jurisdiction.
The Exchequer Court did have jurisdiction under the Admiralty Act,
1934 to hear claims for building a ship provided the ship were under
an arrest. In the case at hand the ship was not under arrest, however
this did not matter as the previous limitation is irrelevant where the
admiralty court has unlimited jurisdiction.
6) United Nations v. Atlantic Seaways Corp.
(1979), 28 N.R. 207; (1980), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (Fed. C.A.)
rev. [1978] 2F.C. 510; [1979] A.M.C. 398
The Federal Court of Appeal reversed Gibson J. and held that the
Federal Court of Canada has jurisdiction to hear a claim for damage
to cargo carried from New Orleans to Yemen where the contract of
carriage provided that the contract should be governed by Canadian
law and should be tried in Canada by the Federal Court of Canada.
The court held that once it is determined that a particular claim is
one which falls within s. 22 of the Federal Court Act, the claim
must be deemed to be one recognized by Canadian maritime law.
The case at hand did fall within s.22 of the Federal Court Act, and
being an in personam cargo action suffered no restrictions that
bound an in personam collision case under section 43(4).
7) Davie Shipbuilding Limited v. The Queen
[197912 F.C. 235 (Fed. Ct., Gibson J.)
A shipbuilder sued the Crown for whom it was building a ship and
the Crown counterclaimed against the shipbuilder. A third party was
25. (1979), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 28.
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called into the case being the builder of the engines. It was held that
the Court had jurisdiction over all matters and parties by applying
the ancillary jurisdiction concept. According to this concept where
the main action in the proceedings is within the jurisdiction of the
Court, issues which are really ancilliary to the main subject matter
are also within the courts jurisdiction. According to Rand J. in The
"Sparrows Point" v. Greater Vancouver Water District26 the
concept is based upon considerations of convenience and justice
which imply that a claimant may prosecute in a single cause of
action all remedies to which he is entitled, This concept eliminates
the possibility of different results being determined in different
courts.
8) Santa Marina Shipping Co. S.A. v. Lunham & Moore Ltd.,
[1979] 1 F.C. 24 (Fed. Ct., Dub6 J.)
Held that Canadian maritime law from time immemorial has
encompassed a claim relating to the use of a ship by charterparty
and this is now found in para. 22(2) (i) of the Federal Court Act.
Further that if the charterparty, by its terms, is to be construed
according to English law then that law will be applied by the
Canadian court. Thus the stricture in Quebec North Shore Paper
27
that a federal law apply is reduced to a condition that a federal law
be applicable generally but not necessarily apply in the particular
case.
II. Questions of Procedure
The Federal Court Rules 28 have been in existence for more than ten
years. They have been amended innumerable times and are slowly
being understood. Judgments relating to questions of procedure are
now fewer in number and usually give rise to questions of substance
rather than of technique.
1) Bright Star Steamship Co. v. The "Lorna P",
[1979] 2 F.C. 435; (1980), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 575; (1979), 29
N.R. 24 (Fed. C.A.)
Two ships collided and one was arrested. Bail was provided by the
arrested vessel whose owner then took suit in counterclaim against
26. [1951] S.C.R. 396.
27. Supra, note 3.
28. Made under s. 46 of the Federal Court Act R.S.C. 1970 c. 10 (2nd Supp.).
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the first vessel. It was held that the owner of the arrested vessel
could not demand security as a matter of course from the other ship
because it had by that time left the jurisdiction. Also the Trial
Division no longer has power that it possessed under s.22 of the
former Admiralty Act R.S.C. 1970, c.A-1 to force a plaintiff in an
action for damages resulting from a collision to file security for a
counter claim of the defendant.
2) Saint John Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Ltd. v. Kingsland Marine
et al. (Scol Eminent)
(1979), 24 N.R. 377 (Fed. C.A.)
The Federal Court of Appeal held that a ruling of a trial judge of the
Federal Court on the admissibility of evidence could not be
appealed. Statutory jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the trial
division is derived from sections 27 and 28 of the Federal Court
Act. An appeal lies from any final judgements, any judgement on a
question of law determined before a trial, or any interlocutory
judgement. None of these conditions were met in the case at hand.
3) May & Baker (Canada) Ltd. v. Motor Tanker "Oak"
(1979), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 692 (Fed. C.A.)
Two extensions of time to serve the writ were obtained from the
Federal Court although the defendant was available for service.
Service was eventually made and then after the defendant appeared
conditionally the Federal Court refused a motion of the defendant
that the extention of time to serve the writ had been granted without
sufficient reasons. The Federal Court of Appeal reversed the court
of first instance because insufficient reason was given for not
serving within the time fixed by the Rules. According to Jackett
C.J., "where the defendant was available for service and the
plaintiff was not inhibited from serving or induced by the defendant
not to serve, it is almost impossible to think of a 'sufficient reason'
for not serving within the time fixed for serving.' '29
4) Lido Industrial Products v. Teledyne Industries Inc.
(1979), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 81 (Fed. C.A.)
A witness who is out of the county cannot be compelled to appear in
court prior to trial and as the witness in question was not necessarily
29. May & Baker (Canada) Ltd. v. Motor Tanker "Oak" (1979), 89 D.L.R. (3d)
692 at p. 694.
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under the control of the defendant, the defence is not subject to
being struck out. (This was a patent case but it is useful in
Admiralty matters.)
5) Newfoundland Steamships Ltd. et al, v. Canada Steamship
Lines, Ltd. et al.,
[19791 1 F.C. 393; (1979), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 79 (Fed. Ct., Walsh
J.)
Walsh J. permitted an amendment of a statement of claim after
prescription so that a more detailed list of plaintiffs who owned
cargo could be substituted for those originally described as "those
persons interested in cargo laden on board the ship Fort St. Louis
when she caught fire at the Port of Montreal". "New parties" were
not added in light of the original general description; the addition
was merely a precision. The amount claimed was unchanged and no
prejudice would be suffered by defendants. The Court also noted
that by section 38 of the Federal Court Act the delays for suit are
fixed by the law of the Province where the cause of action arose.
[Reversed on appeal, [1980] 2 F.C. 134 (Fed. C.A.)]
6) Orient Leasing Co. Ltd. v. The "Kosei Maru",
[1979] 1.F.C. 670 (Fed. Ct., Marceau J.)
Marceau J. permitted an action in rem to enforce a Japanese ship
sales contract and a Japanese ship mortgage. The Court refused to
adopt an original interpretation of Japanese law which would have
run contrary to all existing Japanese law on the matter.
III. Carriage of Goods Judgments
A number of excellent carriage of goods by sea judgments were
rendered during 1979 which enrich Canadian case law on the
question.
1) Amjay Cordage Limited c. The Margarita,
[1979128 N.R. 265 (Fed. C.A.)
Here the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that the true measure of
damages in cargo claims is the market value of sound twine (the
cargo in question) at the port of delivery less the amount which was
recovered or might reasonably have been recovered on resale of the
damaged cargo.
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2) Marubeni America Corp. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd.,
[1979] 2 F.C. 283; (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 518 (Fed. Ct.,
Marceau J.)
The Himalaya clause in an ocean bill of lading was held to be valid
under the common law but not as a "stipulation pour autrui" under
the Civil Code of Quebec. In consequence a terminal operator in
Montreal could rely on the Himalaya clause for loss of goods after
discharge and as there was no evidence of "faute lourde" the
terminal operator was not responsible.
3) Coutinho, Caro & Co. (Canada) Ltd. v. The "ERMUA",
[197912 F.C. 528 (Fed. Ct., Walsh J.)
Walsh J. held that each lift composed of steel angles strapped
together was a single package although the bill of lading described
the number of lifts and pieces. The stamp "said to contain indicated
number of pieces" marked on the bill of lading, however, did not
relieve the carrier of the prima facie presumption against it that the
shipment was as so described and that the lifts contained the number
of angles stipulated on the bill of lading.
4) Captain v. Far Eastern Steamship Co.
(1980), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 250 (B.C. S.C., MacDonald J.)
MacDonald J. of the B.C. Supreme Court upheld a number of basic
principles of carriage by sea. Firstly, the bill of lading is only
evidence of the contract of carriage, albeit important evidence.
Secondly that even if the bill of lading is issued later, then its terms
and conditions still form part of the contract. Thirdly, it is a
fundamental breach of the contract to leave non-waterproofed lifts
in the open subject to the rain during transshipment. In consequence
the carrier could not rely on the exclusion of liability clauses in the
bill of lading.
5) Atlantic Consolidated Foods Ltd. v. The "Doroty",
[1979] 1 F.C. 283; [1978] E.T. L. 550 (Fed. Ct., Dub6 J.)
[Affirmed on appeal, January 23, 1980, unreported as yet]
Cargo was damaged in a voyage from Taboga, a Pacific island off
Panama to St. Andrews N.B. Canada. The Court correctly held that
t was not sufficient for the carrier to exercise due diligence to make
:he refrigeration equipment sound at the beginning of the voyage.
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Rather the absolute obligation under the Hague Rules was to
"properly and carefully" care for the goods subject to the
exceptions to the Rules. The Court added with reason that the
Hague Rules have precedence over the clauses of the bill of lading.
6) Couvreur Verdun Inc. v. March Shipping Ltd,
[1978] C.S. 227 (Superior Court of Quebec, Gratton 1.)
Gratton J. of the Quebec Superior Court held that the agent of the
carrier was not responsible to the cargo owner for damage to cargo.
It was clear from the advice note and the bill of lading that the agent
was not the carrier but only the agent.
7) Quebec Liquor Corp. v. "Dart Europe"
[1979] A.M.C. 2382 (Fed. Ct., Dub6 J.)
Containers holding fibre board cases of gin were carried by sea from
Southampton England to Halifax N.S. and thence by rail to
Montreal. Nearly 700 cases were stolen from two containers in the
railway's storage yard. The defendant was allowed to rely on its
limitation clauses because its security was not grossly negligent.
Dub6 J. found that it was the intention of the parties to consider the
individual cases to constitute packages and not the containers. If the
loss had taken place in the ocean carrier's hands the per package
limitation would have been £100 per case but the railroad tariff was
held applicable which has a limit of $10,000.00 Canadian per
container.
8) Westcoast Food Brokers Ltd. v. "The Hoyanger",
[1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 79 (Fed. Ct. Addy J.)
(Upheld in appeal, [19801 A.M.C. 2193)
A cargo of apples was unfit for the 45 day voyage from Buenos
Aires to Vancouver, B.C. and the carrier in issuing a clean bill of
lading had hired an expert who erroneously applied Argentine
standards which did not contemplate such a long voyage. The
judgment relieved the carrier from responsibility because a carrier is
under no obligation to hire an expert at all but is only obliged to
declare "The apparent order and conditions of the goods" by
Article III (i) (c) of the Hague Rules.
IV. Maritime Liens
Canadian case law on maritime liens is extremely limited and this is
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unfortunate as most of the substantive law on liens is found only in
the common law. Two judgments were reported in 1979 which ate
of interest.
I) Tanguay v. Gulf-Brownsville Shipping Ltd.
(1979), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (Fed. Ct., Marceau J.)
Crew members had a valid claim and maritime lien against a ship
for wages. Section 44 of the Canada Shipping Act, 30 however, does
not give the Federal Court authority to prohibit transactions having
to do with a ship or its transfer, because of a maritime lien. Section
44 is limited to those who have a "direct property right" in a ship
and the Court held this was true of a maritime lien holder.
2) Osborn Refrigerator Sales & Senice Inc., v. The "Atlantean
TI,
[1979] 2 F.C. 661; (1980), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 11 (Fed. Ct. Walsh
J.)
This judgment clearly and painstakingly sets out the order of
ranking of many maritime liens in Canada. The role of equity
modifying those rules is also explained. The judgment along with
Kierstead D.J. in Comeau's Sea Foods v. The "Frank and Troy" 31
gives Canadian recorded law two detailed recent judgments on
maritime liens and their ranking.
V. General Matters
1) Iron Mac Towing Ltd. v. North Arm Highlander
(1979), 28 N.R. 348 (Fed C.A., Urie J.)
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld a judgment of $1,200.00 to a
towing. company which had rendered salvage services. The salvor
and crew were at no time in danger and so the award was low.
2) Pacific Pilotage Authority v. S.S. "Alaska"
(1979), 28 N.R. 451 (Fed. C.A.)
The Pacific Pilotage Regulations calling for compulsory pilotage
could be waived for ships registered in the U.S. and Canada. A
Liberian ship would thus have had to take a pilot although
constantly plying the waters in question. The Federal Court of
30. R.S.C. c. S-9.
31. [1971] F.C. 556.
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Appeal upheld the trial court and ruled that the restriction as to place
of registration of the ship was invalid as it did not relate to the
Authority's mandate to establish an efficient pilotage system for the
attainment of safety.
3) Sabb Inc. v. Shipping Ltd.,
L1979] 1 F.C. 461 (Fed. C.A., Pratte J. andLe Dain J.)
Stevedores were not permitted to claim unpaid money due for
services rendered to various vessels from the agents of those vessels
because the agents had always made it clear that they were merely
agents and at no time undertook to be personally liable.
4) Curits v. Jacques et al.
(1979), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 112; (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 552
(O.H.C., Steele J.)
Bodily injury was suffered by a passenger in one power boat which
collided with another such boat on the inland waters of Ontario. The
portionate fault rule of section 638 of the Canada Shipping Act
applies to damage to ships and cargoes but not to injury to persons
(relying on the Supreme Court of Canada in Stein et al v. The Kathy
K32). Because the collision took place in inland waters, however,
the Ontario Negligence Act 33 applied and the Court held it had
authority to apportion fault which it did - 80% and 20% against the
defendants. By the Ontario Negligence Act as well the defendants
were jointly and severally liable to plaintiff.
5) The "Steelton" (No. 2),
[1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 431 (U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. of Ohio)
A ship damaged a bridge in the Welland Canal in Canadian waters.
The Federal Court (Addy J.) had held that plaintiffs whose business
was affected by the blockage of the Seaway did not have a valid
claim for such economic loss under Canadian law. Suit was then
taken in an American Court which held that the lex loci delicti
applied and that the ruling of Addy J. was the law of Canada most
directly on the point and was binding on the American Court.
32. [197612S.C.R. 802.
33. R.S.O. 1970 c. 296.
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6) Smith & Moxan v. Smith & Langley Flight Centre Limited
[1979] 4 W.W.R. 665; (1980), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 189 (B.C.
S.C., Meredith J.)
Meredith J. of the B.C. Supreme Court held that salvage claims
could be made for the rescue of vessels undei s. 517 of the Canada
Shipping Act3 4 and to a lesser extent for aircraft by Section 514.
Nevertheless section 514 applies to aircraft "over the sea or tidal
waters and on or over the Great Lakes." Thus in the present case
only the rules of land salvage applied because the aircraft
overturned inland, over the waters of Harrison Lake, B.C.
34. R.S.C. 1970 c. S-9.
